
























We investigate the efficiency of disaggregated public capital
provision for the Japanese economy.    We estimate the optimality conditions
based on simultaneous Euler equations by using GMM.  Our results
suggest that public capital productivities have been relatively high and
divergent among several public capital goods.  The allocation of public
works is not optimal yet in Japan.
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1. Introduction
Spending on public works has been very high in Japan among
developed countries.  The ratio of general government fixed capital
formation to GDP amounted to 8% in 1998, compared with 1 to 3% in other
industrial countries.    In recent years, it is widely believed in Japan that the
aggregate level of public capital is sufficiently provided.  However, it is
also well recognized that there may be a shortage of public capital in some
areas such as public works in the urban area.    This paper intends to provide
some empirical evidence of such conjectures.    Namely, this paper is a first
attempt to investigate the optimality of disaggregated public capital for
Japan by estimating and testing the efficient allocation conditions using
Hansen (1982)’s generalized method of moments (GMM).
There are many empirical studies on the productivity effect of public
capital infrastructure, (Aschauer, 1989), (Munnell, 1990), (Macmillan and
Smyth, 1994) and (Batina, 1998) for the U.S. economy and (Iwamoto,
1990), (Asako et.al, 1994), (Mitsui and Ohta, 1995), (Akagi, 1996),
(Yoshino and Nakano, 1996), (Doi, 1998) and (Ida and Yoshida, 1999) for
the Japanese economy.    Aschauer (1989), Munnell (1990), Iwamoto (1990)
and Mitsui and Ohta (1995) estimated the aggregate production function
using aggregate time series data of public capital.   Asako et.al (1994),
Yoshino and Nakano (1996) and Ida and Yoshida (1999) employed several
panel data of public capital for Japan.  Macmillan and Smyth (1994)
estimated the VAR model in first differences.  Batina (1998) found
evidence of multiple cointegration properties among aggregate output, labor,
private capital and social capital for the US.
From the normative point of view, it is crucial to judge whether
public capital is efficiently provided.  Iwamoto (1990) and Mitsui and
Ohta (1995) calculated the marginal productivity of public capital based on
the estimated production function and concluded that the public capital
stock was too small in Japan until the early 1980s compared with the
optimal level.    Akagi (1996) studied the optimality of public capital for the
living environment and found that it was not well founded in Japan.    Ihori
and Kondo (1998) and Kondo and Ihori (1999) evaluated the Japanese
public investment policy by estimating the response of private consumption
to public works.(1) Otto and Voss (1998) and Kitasaka (1999) characterized3
the efficient allocation conditions of both private and public capital and
examined whether these conditions were rejected by the data in Australia
and in Japan respectively using Hansen(1982)’s generalized method of
moments.(2) Kitasaka (1999) concluded that the stock of Japanese public
capital goods was efficiently provided at the aggregate level.  However,
even though public capital has been sufficiently provided in the aggregate
level, it does not necessarily mean that optimality is attained at the
disaggregated level.  Whether the efficient allocation of various types of
public capital goods has been attained consistently is not empirically
verified yet for Japan.
The approach we pursue is as follows. We derive efficient provision
conditions of private capital goods and various types of public capital goods.
We estimate the parameters in these conditions using GMM and examine
whether the hypothesis of the optimal provision is rejected by an
overidentification test statistic.  This procedure provides useful
information about which types of capital goods are efficiently provided and
the estimates of the productivities related to such capital goods. However, it
does not provide information about whether the other public capital goods
are too small or not compared with the efficient level. Therefore, we
estimate an aggregate production function, too. We can thus calculate the
productivities of all types of disaggregated public capital goods. Gramlich
(1994) criticized this approach in the sense that it tended to overestimate
productivities of public capital goods.(3)  However, the results may
provide some information about the allocation of the public capital goods,
some of which are judged to be inefficiently provided by the GMM
estimates.
Our empirical results suggest that some public capital goods are not
optimally provided although public capital productivities have been very
high in Japan.  Especially, public capital goods related to railways,
infrastructures for telephone networks, telegraph, and postal services are
still too low compared with the efficient level.
2. The Model
We consider a standard neoclassical growth model with productive
public capital. The aggregate production function of the economy is given
by4
Y t = F(GKt,PKt,Lt),  ( 1 )
where  Y ,  GK,  PK  and  L denote aggregate output, a vector of public
capital stocks, the private capital stock, and the labor input, respectively.
The public capital vector represents n types of public capital goods:
) (
2 1 n
t t t t GK GK GK Λ = GK .
We assume that the production technology exhibits the constant-
returns-to-scale property with respect to private inputs  PK  and  L, and
that public capital  GK  raises the productivities. In each factor market, as
the result of the optimization of competitive firms, the factor price is
determined as the marginal productivity, which is a function of the
aggregate factor endowments:
) 1 ( / ) , , ( 1 PK t t t t t PK L PK F r δ − + ∂ ∂ = + GK ,  ( 2 )
t t t t t L L PK F w ∂ ∂ = / ) , , (GK ,  ( 3 )
where  PK δ ,  t r  and  t w  denote the depreciation rate of private capital,
interest rate and wage rate respectively.  The total factor payments just
exhaust the aggregate output.
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where  ρ  denotes the discount rate and  t C  denotes private consumption.
) ( u  is the instantaneous utility function. We assume that  ) ( u  is increasing
in  t C  and concave.    The budget constraint for the individual is
t t t t t t t T C L w A r A − − + + = + ) 1 ( 1 ,  ( 5 )
where  t A  ,  t L  and  t T  denote asset, labor supply, and lump-sum taxes
respectively. The individual chooses a consumption path and an asset
accumulation path in order to maximize utility in (4) subject to the
constraint in (5).  In our model, the labor/leisure preference is not taken
into account.    In such a case, the individual supplies the full amount of the
labor endowment inelastically. The first order condition with respect to the
asset accumulation path satisfies5






































.  ( 6 )
This condition is the standard Euler equation.
The public capital stock vector and the lump sum taxes are taken as
given for the firms and the individuals in the economy. The government’s
budget constraint must satisfy:
∑ ∑
= =








t t GK GK T
1 1
1 ) 1 ( δ ,  ( 7 )
where  δ GK denotes the depreciation rate of public capital.
We are now able to present the structure of a dynamic equilibrium
by combining the characteristics of the production function and the
optimizing behavior of the individuals. In our closed economy model, the
private capital stock is entirely owned by domestic residents. Namely, the
asset owned by individuals equals the private capital stock:
t t PK A = .  ( 8 )
From (2), (3), (7), (8) and the fact that the factor payments just exhaust the
aggregate output, we can transform (5) into the resource constraint equation
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Substituting (2) into (6), we get
0 1 ) 1 (

















































.   (10)
Equations (9) and (10) describe the dynamic behavior of the equilibrium.
The first best economy is the economy where  } { t GK  as well as
} { t PK  is chosen to maximize (4) subject to (9).    Consequently, in addition
to (10), the following conditions are also satisfied:
0 1 ) 1 (

















































n i , , 2 , 1 Λ =   ( 1 1 )
These  1 + n  conditions imply, roughly, that in each period there should be6
no differences among the returns of all the capital goods and that in the long
run they should be equal to the individual’s discount rate, too, as discussed
by Arrow and Kurtz (1970).
Thus far the relative prices for investment goods to output or
consumption goods are assumed to be constant.  However, as we will see
later, that is not the case in Japan.  The public investment goods have
become more expensive than aggregate output over time.    This reflects the
adjustment costs associated with the installation of capital goods.
Including relative prices for investment goods in our model, we modify the
conditions (10) and (11) as
0 1 ) 1 (
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n i , , 2 , 1 Λ =   (13)
where  t p  and 
i
t p  are relative prices for private and public investment
goods to aggregate output respectively.  In period t, one unit of output
can be transformed into 
i
t p / 1  units of the investment good and in the next
period it increases output and capital stock by 
i
t GK F 1 / + ∂ ∂  and
i
t GK p 1 ) 1 ( + − δ  respectively.
3. Empirical Evidence
3.1 Data
The data sources of public capital goods we use are fairly standard
in this literature.  In Japan, disaggregated data for the 20 types of public
capital goods for the sample period FY1953-1993 at prices in CY1990 are
available from “Social Capital in Japan” (Economic Planning Agency,
1998).  These data are calculated by employing PI method (Perpetual
Inventory Method) or BY method (Benchmark Year Method).  The
original flow data for the 20 types of public investment are defined and
calculated by the same way as public fixed capital formation is in the SNA,
“Annual Report on National Account” (Economic Planning Agency).  We
use gross domestic product and private final consumption expenditure for
the sample period FY1955-1993 at market prices in CY1990 from “Annual7
Report on National account”.  Therefore, disaggregated public capital
goods data in “Social Capital in Japan” are suitable for our empirical
investigations.  These 20 types of public capital goods can be classified
into two large groups, public capital goods for the production infrastructure
and the ones for the living environment.
We pick up the 13 kinds of public capital goods that belong to the
former group and sum them up to the following five components:
Group 1:    Roads, harbors and airports
(consists of 3 types of public capital goods)
Group  2:  Railways
(consists of 3 types of public capital goods)
Group 3:    Postal service, telephone and telegraph
(consists of 2 types of public capital goods)
Group 4:    Agriculture-related public capitals and fishing ports
(consists of 2 types of public capital goods)
Group 5:    Erosions of flood control and conservation of forests
(consists of 3 types of public capital goods).
As for private capital goods, we use the gross capital stock data of
all enterprises in “Gross Capital Stock of Private Enterprises” (Economic
Planning Agency) times operating ratio in “Statistics on Japanese
Industries” (Ministry of International Trade and Industry).  It must be
noted that some public companies were privatized in 1980s.  Nippon
Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation and Japan National Railways
(JNR) were privatized in 1985 and in 1987 respectively.    They were newly
named as Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Company (NTT) and Japan
Railways (JR) respectively.  The capital stock data of JR and NTT are
included in gross capital stock data of all enterprises in “Gross Capital
Stock of Private Enterprises”. In this paper, they are derived from the
private capital stock data and added to Group2 and Group3 respectively.
As for the prices of aggregate output and private sector investment
goods, we use deflators of GDP and private sectors gross domestic fixed
capital formation for plant and equipment in “Annual Report on National
account” respectively.    We can use the deflators of investment goods of 20
types of public sectors, NTT and JR from “Social Capital in Japan”.
Weighting them with the real values of the investment goods included in
that group, we calculate each price of public investment goods for the 58
groups.
Output-capital ratios and relative prices of investment goods are
presented in Figure 1 and Figure 2 respectively.  Their time series
properties will be discussed in the following subsection.
In estimating the efficiency conditions, we use per capita
consumption data divided by the total population in “Monthly Report on
Current Population Estimates” (Management and Coordination Agency).
As for labor supply, we use employed labor force in “Labor Force
Survey” (Management and Coordination Agency) times total hours worked
indices in manufacturing in “Final Report of Monthly Labor Survey” (the
Ministry of Labor).







1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Group 4 Group 5 Private Capital9
Figure 2: Relative prices of Investment Goods
3.2 Efficiency Conditions
In this section, we intend to estimate and test the efficient allocation
conditions by GMM.
First of all, we must specify the production function and utility
function to transform (10)-(13) into testable equations.  We specify the
production function as
φ γ γ γ γ γ β
t t t t t t t t L GK GK GK GK GK PK Y
5 4 3 2 1
5 4 3 2 1 = .   (14)
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where  σ  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and non-negative.
With these specifications, we can rewrite (10) and (11) as
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and we can rewrite (12) and (13) as
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5 , , 2 , 1 Λ = i   .   (19)
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should be uncorrelated with any information available at time  t:11
0 ) ( 1 = ⊗ + t t I u E ,   (20)
where  t I  is the  l dimension information set.  These  l × 6  unconditional
moment conditions are suitable for generalized method of moments (GMM)
developed by Hansen(1982).  Therefore, with GMM we can estimate the
parameters.  However, we will focus on the estimation of only the
production parameters:  ) , , , ( 5 1 γ γ β θ Λ = .
The GMM estimator of  θ  denoted  GMM θˆ  is given by
) ( min arg ˆ θ θ Q GMM =  where  ) ( ) ( ) (
1 θ θ θ T T T g W g Q
− ′ =   .   (21)
In (21),  ) (θ T g  is the  l 6  dimension sample average vector of  t t I u ⊗ + 1  and
T W  is symmetric positive-definite matrix that converges in probability to
the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of  t t I u ⊗ + 1 .  Under the
hypothesis that the condition (20) is correct, the test statistic  ) ˆ ( GMM Q T θ ×
is distributed as  ) 6 6 (
2 − l χ .  This statistic is called Hansen’s J-statistic
and can be used to test the validity of the model.
A plausible conjecture is that not all capital goods are efficiently
provided.  It may be nearer the truth to say that private capital goods and
some types of public capital goods may be optimally provided, while other
types of public capital goods may not be.  Namely, our conjecture is that
(16) and only some of (17) will hold (or,  (18) and only some of (19) will
hold). Therefore, we analyze which public goods are efficiently provided
changing the combinations of the public capital goods put into the GMM.
It seems that the model without adjustment costs of investments is
less realistic than the model with adjustment costs.  Figure 2 shows that
investment goods have been more expensive than aggregate output.  It
contradicts the theoretical precondition of no installation costs.    Moreover,
the GMM estimators will not consistent and asymptotically normal unless
the series  PK Y/  and 
i GK Y/ ) 5 , , 1 ( Λ = i  are covariance stationary.
Figure 1 shows that these series may exhibit nonstationary behavior.(4)
Therefore, we focus on the efficiency conditions (18) and (19) derived from
the model with adjustment costs.
Before turning to GMM, we examine whether the variables included12
in equations (18) and (19) have unit roots by the Augmented-Dickey-Fuller
(ADF) unit root test.    We estimate the regression
∑
=
− − ∆ + + + = ∆
m
j
j t j t t x x t x
1
1 0 φ φ µ λ ,
where  t x  is a variable included in the efficiency conditions.    Then we test
the null hypotheses of a unit root that  0 0 = φ  and that  0 = µ  and  0 0 = φ .
The results are presented in Table1. For 
2 2
1 1 / / t t t p GK Y + +  and 
3 3
1 1 / / t t t p GK Y + +
the null hypotheses of a unit root cannot be rejected.    It is well known that
the GMM will not provide efficient estimates when nonstationary series are
included. In such a case, we cannot say that such capital goods are
efficiently provided from a theoretical point of view as discussed earlier.
The returns of the capital goods are expected to converge to the households’
discount rate in the long run as long as they are on the optimal accumulation
path.  The returns of the capital goods with unit roots violate such a
condition.  Therefore, we estimate (18) and (19) with respect to the three
types of public capital ( 5 , 4 , 1 = i ).13
Table 1: Univariate Statistics and the Results of the Unit Root Tests










t t C C / 1 + 1.048 0.028 1.097 0.999 -3.422* 5.930*
t t t p PK Y / / 1 1 + + 0.730 0.081 0.866 0.610 -3.480* 8.338**
1 1
1 1 / / t t t p GK Y + + 6.430 2.663 10.636 2.854 -3.307* 6.016*
2 2
1 1 / / t t t p GK Y + + 11.670 2.275 14.930 5.536 -2.633 4.069
3 3
1 1 / / t t t p GK Y + + 15.107 3.654 22.899 10.893 -2.669 3.569
4 4
1 1 / / t t t p GK Y + + 12.077 4.290 18.538 6.478 -3.252* 5.789*
5 5
1 1 / / t t t p GK Y + + 13.663 3.870 20.214 8.016 -3.073 6.308*
t t p p / 1 + 0.978 0.017 1.022 0.946 -4.767*** 11.436***
1 1
1 / t t p p + 0.991 0.038 1.117 0.925 -3.553** 6.337*
2 2
1 / t t p p + 0.975 0.029 1.039 0.922 -4.255*** 9.202**
3 3
1 / t t p p + 0.966 0.037 1.105 0.913 -4.997*** 12.548***
4 4
1 / t t p p + 0.993 0.030 1.053 0.936 -3.521* 6.298*
5 5
1 / t t p p + 0.991 0.032 1.052 0.928 -3.610** 6.598*
Notes: Sample is 1957-1993. The 1, 5 and 10% critical values are indicated by ***,
** and * respectively.14
We set the discount rate, the coefficient of relative risk aversion and
the depreciation rates at some particular rates.(5) Namely, we set the
discount rate  ρ  and the coefficient of relative risk aversion at 0.04 per
annum and 2, respectively.  We also set the depreciation rate of private
capital goods  PK δ  and that of public capital goods  GK δ  at 0.06 and 0.04
per annum, respectively.
We include one and two lags of the following,
t t C C / 1 + ,  t t t p PK Y / / 1 1 + + , 
1 1
1 1 / / t t t p GK Y + + , 
1 4
1 1 / / t t t p GK Y + + , 
5 5
1 1 / / t t t p GK Y + +
and a constant in instrumental variables set. The estimation results are
presented in Table 2.
Table 2: GMM Results for Efficiency Conditions



















J-statistics 46.8082 42.4020 41.5363 68.4726*
p-value 0.107 0.214 0.242 0.089
Notes: Sample is 1957-1992. The 1, 5 and 10 % critical values are indicated by
***, ** and * respectively. Hansen’s J-statistics obeys 
2 χ  under the null
hypothesis that the capital goods included in the estimation are efficiently
provided.15






















J-statistics 67.4896 62.3072 85.8559
p-value 0.103 0.205 0.127
For each of the cases (i)-(vi), the efficiency conditions imposed by
the model are only rejected for case (iv). We obtain a positive and
significant estimate of the capital output elasticity parameters.  For case
(vii), the efficiency condition imposed by the four equations is supported by
Hansen’s J-statistic. In addition, we obtain a positive and significant
estimate of the parameters that are similar to the results in cases (i)-(vi).
With the estimates in case (vii), we calculate the returns of capital
goods:
)) 1 ( / ˆ )( / 1 ( 1 1 1 PK t t t t p PK Y p δ β − + + + +
and






t p GK Y p δ γ − + + + +  for  5 , 4 , 1 = i .
The results are presented in Figure 3. There are no significant differences
between them as Hansen’s J-statistic supports statistically.16
Figure 3: Investment Returns
We conclude that private capital and the public capital goods of
groups 1, 4 and 5 are efficiently provided.  However, we cannot judge
whether the other public capital good stocks are too small or too large
compared with the efficient level since we cannot estimate the capital
output elasticities for these public capital goods by GMM.
3.3 Public Capital Productivity
To consider whether the public capital goods of groups 2 and 3 are
too small or too large compared with the optimal level, we calculate the
returns of disaggregated public capital goods and compare them with each
other. To obtain the parameters needed in the calculations, we estimate an
aggregate production function. Gramlich (1994) criticized such an approach
in the sense that it tended to overestimate the productivities of public capital
goods. However, in comparing the returns of disaggregated public capital
goods with each other, they provide some useful information. We examine
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or higher than the others that are judged to be efficiently provided in the last
subsection.




















































Notes: Sample is 1957-1994. The 1, 5 and 10 % critical values are indicated by
***,  **,  and  *  respectively.
We incorporate a trend term into (14):
φ γ γ γ γ γ β α α
t t t t t t t
t
t L GK GK GK GK GK PK Ae Y
5 4 3 2 1 1 0
5 4 3 2 1
+ = ,   (22)





t i t t L GK PK t A Y ln ln ln ln ln
5
1
1 0 φ γ β α α + + + + + = ∑
=
.   (23)
To cope with the serial correlation problem, we estimates the following first




t i t t L GK PK Y ln ln ln ln
5
1
1 ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ ∑
=
φ γ β α .   (24)
In Table 3, case (i) is the result of OLS estimation without restrictions
among coefficients. Cases (ii) and (iii) are the results under the constant-
returns-to-scale (CRS) restriction with respect to private inputs and with
respect to all inputs respectively.
Obviously the results may face a serious multicollinearity problem.
To cope with it, we use a principal components regression. First, using the
eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the correlation matrix of explanatory
valuables, we compose principal components. Next, we regress  Y ln ∆  on a
constant and some principal components. The results are reported in Table 4.
Substituting the estimated parameters and their variance covariance matrix
into the relationship between the components and the explanatory variables,
we finally obtain the estimator of the parameters in equation (24) and their
variance covariance matrix.  The results are reported in Table 5.  The
restrictions imposed in cases (i), (ii) and (iii) in Table 4 and 5 are the same
as those imposed in Table 3 respectively.   We can say that all types of
public capital goods have positive effects on aggregate output to some
extent.






















Notes: Sample is 1957-1994. The 1, 5 and 10 % critical values are indicated by
***,  ** and * respectively. In (i), (ii) and (iii), cumulative contribution of these
two principal components are 0.904, 0.917 and 0.925 respectively.




















































Notes: Sample is 1957-1994. The 1, 5 and 10 % critical values are indicated by
***,  **  and  *  respectively.
Next, using the estimates in (i) in Table 5, we calculate the return of






t p GK Y p δ γ − + + + +  for  5 , , 1Λ = i .  Figure
4 shows the results.  The differences among the returns of the public
capital goods of groups 1, 4 and 5 have been relatively small.    On the other
hand, in recent years, the returns for groups 2 and 3 have been diverging
upwards from those of the former groups.    Provided that the public capital20
goods of the groups 1, 4 and 5 are efficiently accumulated, the result here
indicates that the public capital goods of the groups 2 and 3 are still
inadequate compared with the optimal level.
Figure 4: Investment Returns
4. Conclusion
We have investigated the productivity of disaggregated public
capital for the Japanese economy.  We estimated the efficiency conditions
given as simultaneous Euler equations and tested the validity of the model
by GMM.  We also calculated the productivity of public capital by
estimating an aggregate production function.
We can conclude that some types of public capital are not being
accumulated efficiently.  From the estimation of the aggregate production
function, we see that there still exist large differences among the marginal
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We may conclude that the allocation of public capital goods is not optimal
in Japan.  Especially, infrastructures for railways, telephone networks,
telegraph, and postal services are not being accumulated at efficient levels.
Spending on public works should be priority-allocated to projects to
improve allocation efficiency among various areas.  There are some
attempts for such a direction in Japan.  For example, an effort is being
made to put an additional priority on infrastructure investment to improve
the people’s lives and the environment in urban area.  At the same time,
seeking to enhance both efficiency and transparency, the efforts to reduce
costs and to utilize cost-benefit analysis will be complemented by a new re-
assessment system in the near future.  These changes are desirable but the
speed of structural reform is not so high. A further determined effort is
needed to reform public works in a more efficient way.
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Notes
(1) In these papers we develop the theoretical relationship between public
capital productivity and private consumption by employing the
conventional infinite horizon neoclassical framework.  It is shown that
private consumption responds to an unexpected change in the public
investment policy as long as people are concerned with the overall costs and
benefits of public works.
(2) Such an approach has often been employed to estimate and test the
conditions for intertemporal efficiency in the asset pricing literature (e.g
Hansen and Singleton, 1982 and Cochrane, 1991).  In recent years, it is
applied to examine the dynamic efficiency of public investment policy.
(3) The estimation of an aggregate production function contains many
econometric problems such as common trend data and simultaneous bias.
Gramlich pointed out that the estimated returns of public capital are very22
high even though these problems are taken into consideration.
(4) For these series the hypotheses of a unit root can not be rejected even at
the critical value of 20%.
(5) We focus on the production parameters.    Thus, as Otto and Voss (1998),
we set the particular values for the other parameters.    The estimators of the
parameters do not yield economically sensible results unless we develop
individual’s consumption behavior more carefully.  For example, non-
separability of preferences and the existence of non-durables consumption
goods must be taken into consideration.23
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